University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
8-2014

Time-Space Analysis of Terrorist Planning Cycles
Michael Stephen Gerald Eastham
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Human Geography Commons

Citation
Eastham, M. S. (2014). Time-Space Analysis of Terrorist Planning Cycles. Graduate Theses and
Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2226

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Time-Space Analysis of Terrorist Planning Cycles

Time-Space Analysis of Terrorist Planning Cycles

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Geography

by

Michael Eastham
James Madison University
Bachelor of Science in Geographic Science, 2012

August 2014
University of Arkansas

This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

___________________________________
Dr. Fiona Davidson
Thesis Director

___________________________________
Dr. Brent Smith
Committee Member

___________________________________
Dr. Jackson Cothren
Committee Member

Abstract
Terrorism is among the largest threats to national and international security in today’s
global community. Acts of terrorism have resulted economic and societal impacts throughout the
world. Improvements in technology have increased the capacity of terrorists to maximize the
impact of their actions. The increasing influence and prevalence of terrorist activity has
demanded research focused on the prevention of terrorist acts. A known method of terrorism
prevention is uncovering a plot during its planning and preparation phase. Terrorist planning can
be evaluated based on how actors move through space and time prior to the execution of their
attack. General patterns and insights into terrorist planning activities can offer the intelligence,
defense, and law enforcement communities with information on how where terrorists can be
located in relationship to their target throughout their planning cycle. This movement within a
planning cycle can be easily visualized and analyzed through the use of a Time-Space Signature.
This research assesses the movements of actors involved in past terrorist activities in order to
determine how terrorists move in space and time during their planning cycle.
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I. Introduction
The world has been plagued by acts of terrorism for centuries. As terrorists become
increasingly capable of organizing and executing attacks that influence policy and security
concerns at all territorial levels, it becomes more vital to prevent such attacks. While a
considerable amount of terrorist activity goes unnoticed by the general public, larger impact
terrorist attacks such as the Oklahoma City Bombing, Word Trade Center attacks, and the Boston
Marathon Bombing serve as an alarming reminder of terrorist presence. Citizens are informed or
reminded of their vulnerability to such attacks. A nation’s steadfast goal to protect its citizens
from domestic and international acts of terrorism, combined with the publics demand for safety
has fostered a push for prevention of future incidents of terrorism.
Despite the increasing amount of research within the field of terrorism, including attack
prevention and mitigation, there is still little known regarding the planning phase of a terrorist
plots. The planning phase, however, is critical to the success of a terrorist attack. Effective
planning of a terrorist plot can minimize or essentially eliminate the chances of an attacks
failure; once an attack has been meticulously planned and is set in motion it can easily become
impossible to stop (United States, Army Training and Doctrine Command, and Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 2005). Unsuccessful or interrupted planning, however, is
likely to lead to a failed, prevented, or unexecuted attack.
Research has shown that terrorism or political violence is the result of rational thought,
planning, and strategy; terrorism is rarely carried out in a senseless or random fashion (Martin
2011, 20). Violence and criminal activity is employed in terrorist plots as a strategic choice in an
attempt to force change or draw attention to a movement or belief (Martin 2011). Violence and
intimidation is perceived as a morally acceptable strategy that can be invaluable in the
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communication of minority beliefs or opinions (Schmid and Graaf 1982). Terrorists often
perceive their acts as methods to prevent impending dangers or changes to society and the
general public; this mindset allows for the justification of negative externalities of a terrorist plot.
Terrorists select targets and execute acts based on the characteristics, ideologies, and objectives
of their groups. Additionally, terrorists often commit additional or supplemental crimes in order
to support their campaign; these activities can include robberies for funding or supplies as well
as travel to gather forces or avoid detection (Hoffman 1998). The movement of a terrorist group
in space and time is a reflection of their tactics and strategies. The rational, methodical, and
strategic nature of terrorist planning shows that terrorist plots can be studied and analyzed in an
effort to detect and prevent future acts of terrorism.
The objective of this research is to test the methodology for a time-space analysis of
documented terrorist plots in order to detect potential patterns that exist between terrorist
planning cycles. The goal of this research will be to determine how broader scale patterns exist
between how terrorists move over time during the planning and preparatory phase of their
terrorist plot. An insight into the patterns of terrorist movement in space and time leading up to
the commission of a terrorist act could prove beneficial for counterintelligence efforts and
understanding of terrorism at large. Terrorist attacks are often thwarted through collecting data
relative to terrorist actor movement in order to predict their behavior and future movements
(Martin 2011). Investigations have been able to link known components of terrorist plots in order
to locate individuals, bases of operation, and targets. These methods have been used to
successfully apprehend terrorists and foil looming terrorist attacks (United States et al. 2011).
Patterns with terrorist planning cycles discovered could provide an idea of how terrorist
members move throughout the preparation for an attack; understanding where a terrorist is in
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relation to the target could aid prevention efforts by determining a scope area of investigation. A
clearer understanding of terrorist planning cycles is certainly invaluable, as it is known that
terrorist attacks are neither random nor unplanned (Hoffman 1998). The results of this research
will attempt to characterize the planning cycles of terrorists and contribute to the overall
knowledge and understanding of terrorism. This research will produce a methodology for
assessing terrorist-planning cycles individually and within groups. Additionally, the observations
and conclusions derived from this methodology will describe patterns in movement throughout
terrorist planning cycles, as the results are obtained the time-space movement of actual actors
within terrorist plots. As terrorism becomes a growing concern in contemporary society, it
becomes increasingly important to discover new measures to thwart potential terrorist attacks
and thus mitigate would be effects of an attack (Stewart 2012). This research is an effort to
contribute towards the knowledge and understanding of terrorism and terrorist activity.
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II. Literature Review
Terrorism Background
The term terrorism originates from the French Revolution of 1789-1794. The original
meaning of terrorism referred to the government intimidation directed and carried out by the
French political party in power during the revolution (Baker 2006, Furet 1981). Since its
inception, the meaning of the word terrorism has evolved to include actions of citizens towards
other groups and governments. In fact, in contemporary discussion, the term is almost
exclusively applied towards political dissidents that are acting against a government as apposed
to government actions towards citizens. There are a number of criteria that distinguish terrorists
from other criminals. The motivations of terrorists are normally politically or religiously derived
and have political implications and aims. The actions of terrorists are violent and are generally
designed to have psychological or political repercussions that extend beyond the immediate
destruction or victims. Terrorists have also been defined as non-state entities that are organized
in cell structures with identifiable chains of command (Hoffman 1998).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter FBI) has developed a useful definition
of the word terrorism; the bureau considers terrorism to be the “unlawful use of force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” This
definition is useful as it provides the conditions for a criminal act to be considered for a terrorist
investigation and for the convicted criminal to be considered a terrorist (Smith 2006). The US
Department of Defense has a definition almost identical to the definition provided by the FBI,
though it includes threatened use of violence and it states that terrorism can be used to achieve
religious and ideological objectives (United States and Department of the Army 1990). These
definitions essentially outline that an act of terrorism is an illegal and violent act committed in
4

pursuit of a political aim (Hoffman 1993). It must be noted that terrorism as a term is applied
based on perspective. Those committing acts of terrorism are often doing so based on the idea
that they are ‘freedom fighters’ or ‘urban guerillas’ using unconventional, yet necessary, means
to pursue an agenda that needs attention (Hoffman 1993).
There are a number of different types of terrorist groups; these groups are classified based
on their core beliefs that may range from ethical preferences, to political ideals or religious
beliefs.
Today acts of terrorism are widely considered acts that have political purpose and
motivations embedded within their primary objective. These are rational acts that are enacted as
a strategic choice in an effort to achieve change and bring a specific agenda to discussion (Martin
2011). Though terrorism has been practiced officially since the eighteenth century, the increasing
prevalence and impact of terrorism within our modern world is thought to originate from the
political environment and technological improvements that were initiated in the late 1960s.
Guerrilla warfare and militant revolution theories advocated by Mao Zedong resulted in the
development of ‘people’s war’ strategies. Militant action became accessible to common
revolutionaries and was no longer exclusive to the military. Technological developments and
improvements with travel, communication, media, and weapons have improved the ability for
individuals to plot and execute terrorist acts, including acts of a much larger scale (Jenkins
1986).
Following the attacks of September 11, a massive effort to enhance national security was
initiated. Professionals and scholars throughout various fields began to investigate terrorist
activity in order to increase and improve intelligence and develop more effective preventative
measures. Due to the elusive nature of terrorist networks and the methods they employ in their
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attacks, terrorism is very difficult to prevent or defend against; however, the monumental
impacts of terrorist attacks result in the need for a wealth of knowledge on terrorism to better
enable attack prevention (Jenkins 1986).
There is an increasing amount of research within the field of terrorism studies. A
substantial portion of the research on terrorism today involves the field of emergency
management. This research includes the study of methods to reduce the impacts and externalities
of impending acts of terrorism. There are countless studies involving methods of infrastructure
design and assessment (French 2013) that aim to mitigate the effects of an attack through
effective design, maintenance, and planning.
Terrorism as a Study of Sociology
Traditionally, the study of terrorism has been considered an aspect of sociology, with its
roots extending into other fields such as political science and psychology. Analysis of the actions
of terrorists has historically involved philosophical and theoretical approaches. The sociopolitical conditions that encourage acts of terrorism are invaluable in determining the cause of
the incident. An examination of foreign and domestic policy, international relations, religious
beliefs, ethical disputes, economic concerns, and social interactions can be very revealing when
assessing the actions that lead to terrorist incidents. Research based on root causes of terrorist
motivation as well as their viewpoints and justifications is used to study terrorism (Williams
2003).
Theoretical and philosophical studies of terrorism can be aided with the addition of
spatial analysis. The spatial component of human behavior has proved to be a valuable method of
assessment (Bahgat 2013) and its consideration can result in previously unseen yet useful
conclusions.
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Spatial analysis techniques have long been incorporated into research within the field of
criminology. Scientific criminology began in the early nineteenth century with the work of
Andre-Michael Guerry and Adolphe Quetelet in the field of moral statistics. Spatial analysis
techniques challenged traditional concepts by incorporating the importance of place and
quantitative measures within crime assessment (Lowman 1986). Historic examples of spatial
studies in criminology are widely available. An early study of juvenile delinquency in 1916
showed that the location of residence was a more significant influence on an individual’s
appearance in juvenile court than age, sex, and race (Burgess, 1915). Over time, the field of
criminology transitioned through several phases including the Chicago ecological school of the
1920s and 1930s, and the factor analytic school of the 1950s and 1960s. The methods that
emerged from the factor analytics increased interest in spatial perspectives in the study and
analysis on crime (Lowman, 1986).
A sub field deemed as environmental criminology emerged from the research that placed
emphasis upon the spatial dimensions of criminal behavior. These studies placed the focus on the
spatial locations and situations that encouraged or facilitated crime rather than the social
conditions and individual decisions that cause crime. This field began to form a link with
geographical research, as it attempted to explain where criminal opportunities exist as a function
of why they occur (Herbert 1985). Place based analysis of patterns in crime developed with the
improved capabilities of computerized mapping and spatial analysis. These assessments were
further enhanced with the advent of spatial statistics in the 1990s (Anselin 2000). Social theories
are used in combination with measures of crime in order to conduct analyses of criminal activity
and at risk populations. A study in Vancouver, Canada used spatial regression techniques to
support criminal activity theories and determine at risk populations (Andersen 2006).
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A number of regional conflict studies, including regional terrorism, incorporate GIS and
spatial analysis. Though these studies are conducted within the field of conflict studies, they
examine events similar or relating to terrorism and employ the same analysis techniques; their
research places an importance on geography as an added element of assessment. A study of state
terror and massacres within Guatemala utilized the mapping of massacres to visualize patterns
and trends (Steinberg 2003). Another similar study assesses the presence of xenophobia and
racism in the Netherlands through the use of geographical and temporal assessments. The results
of the study attempt to show the ways in which concepts of racism spread (Braun 2011). The
temporal variable has also been incorporated into crime analysis to determine patterns within
both space and time. Research of crime in Stockholm, Sweden employed a space-time analysis
of clusters of crime in order to show changes in types of crime based on seasonal change
(Uittenbogaard A and Ceccato V 2012). In a similar study, space-time and statistical analysis
was used to investigate near repeat patterns of serial offenders involved in dwelling burglary
(Johnson 2013).
Though the study of terrorism is often considered a field within sociology, as it pertains
to criminology, it has an apparent geographical nature, thus it has become a topic of study for
many of the nations leading geographers (Mathewson 2003).
The Geography of Terrorism
Geography has long been considered the study of mapping and territorial discovery;
however, in more recent decades the study of geography has expanded and diffused to include
interactions of human societies and natural environments (Blij 2005). The field of geography is
concerned with any material that exhibits three components, a region, a technique, and a theory.
The study of terrorism naturally falls within the field of geography; terrorism has an observable
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locational component that can be studied throughout a defined region, it can be studied with
geomatic and statistical techniques, and the patterns observed can be theorized. These
characteristics make it an appealing topic for geographers. At this point there is a limited extent
of research within the geography of terrorism, including spatial analysis of terrorism; however,
the fields value is becoming more pronounced and recognized as research within the field
increases (Braithwaite 2007; Nunn 2007).
A geographical approach can inform new understandings of social and political incidents
and relationships. Though historically researchers have not investigated terrorism within the
geographical framework, its apparent geographical or spatial nature has resulted in studies within
the geography of terrorism. Assessing terrorism as a function of geography can offer new
outlooks on patterns and trends. Terrorism is often related to the field of geography due to its
strong sociocultural foundations that exhibit human geographic characteristics (Bahgat 2013).
Daanish Mustafa advocates for the use of a geographic hazards perspective in the assessment of
terrorism. He suggests that a society can also be vulnerable to terrorism as a result of social
structures and their impacts on individuals or societies in the same way that a society can be
vulnerable to a natural hazard depending on the biophysical characteristics of the environment
(Mustafa, 2003). Geographical thinking can be applied towards numerous aspects of terrorism
research including the causes of terrorism, the spatiality of terrorist networks as well as their
movements and actions, an the assessment of counter-terrorism efforts (Flint, 2008).
Much of the theoretical and empirical geographic research on terrorism involves analysis
into the factors that influence terrorism. The interplay of geographic factors within or between
countries can effectively curb or alternatively encourage terrorism. The roots of terrorism can
therefore be seen as a function of geographic phenomena such as state fractionalization, poverty,
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or political freedom (Bandyopadhyay 2011). Terrorism can also be studied as a function of land
use and environmental settings in order to provide insights into areas where acts of terrorism are
likely to occur (Nunn 2007). There are a number of factors that influence the emergence of
terrorist agendas and activities; these factors are the product of areas geographical attributes.
Spatial and Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism
Advances in spatial technology and quantitative analysis techniques have enabled more
efficient observance of spatial patterns. Criminal activity, which includes terrorism, is comprised
of an observable and measureable spatial attribute; consequentially spatial analysis can be
applied to relevant data. Locational and attribute data regarding an incidence of terrorism can be
collected, geographically referenced, and projected. Once captured, the geospatial data can be
visualized and utilized as maps, images, and models in order to make inferences, assessments, or
explanations. Much of these techniques and research have developed into a field known as
geospatial intelligence (Bahgat 2013). Additionally, terrorism research often builds on previous
work used to forecast criminal behavior.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, planned and
orchestrated by the terrorist group al Qaeda, had a monumental effect on the study of terrorism.
Not only did the World Trade Center attacks greatly increased the need and use of Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) within emergency management and preventative models for planning
(Kevany 2011; and Koch 2010) they also demanded further research on terrorist activity. Overall
the 2001 terrorist attacks served as a catalyst that changed the focus and concern of terrorism
research.
One of the major problems that terrorism researchers are faced with is the lack of
available data. This shortcoming results in the lack of widespread innovative analysis on the
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subject. An early attempt at an empirical analysis into the dynamics of terrorism, carried out by
L. C. Hamilton and J. D. Hamilton in 1983, was afflicted by the lack of data. The results of the
study showed some evidence that the tendency of terrorist acts to incite further violence was not
as prevalent in less democratic, poorer, and less educated societies than in other areas; however,
improved data would have contributed towards more solidified results (Hamilton 1983).
Data is becoming more widely available. A number of databases have been created, with
varying success, in order to provide terrorism data to researchers and further topical research. A
database that is commonly cited in relevant research is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
which was created by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START) to address the lack of empirical data as well as code and verify previously
inaccessible and unavailable data (LaFree 2006). There are a number of additional databases that
contain terrorism data; Bowie and Schmid have compiled a list of twenty major terrorism
databases in their Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research; the aspiration of their
compilation is to make terrorism data more discoverable for researchers. Their discussion
includes a detailed history, methodology, and evaluation of each of the databases (Schmid 2011).
Much of the data available on incidents of terrorism is retained at the country level; limiting the
detail of forthcoming analysis. The lack of data has resulted in a relatively limited amount of
geo-spatial research regarding terrorism (Gao 2006); however despite the apparent lack of data,
the importance of this topic has resulted in an increasing amount of geospatial assessments of
terrorist activities.
Prior to the World Trade Center attacks, terrorism research was focused on the modest
actions of single domestic non-state actors towards civilians and security forces. These groups
included large, long-standing groups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian
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Liberation Organization; however, large portions of terrorist groups were small in size and
influence and vague in ambition and agenda, including Black September and Red Brigades. The
second wave of terrorist research was concerned with large-scale, international, and direct
attacks that would be executed as an act of war (Pape 2009). The realization of the capabilities of
elaborate and organized terrorist networks, as well as the fear of future attacks, has increased the
prominence of research within the field. Much of the recent terrorism research has been based on
the use of spatial and quantitative techniques that incorporate the use of Geographic Information
Science (GIS).
Geographic literature on terrorism that involved the use of GIS was initially based on the
idea that spatial studies could provide valuable contributions to homeland security. Common
studies included the use of spatial data, spatial statistics, and models. Relevant studies also
incorporated geographic techniques through other means. An example of one such study was
research that employed geographic profiling studies aimed at locating and apprehending those
involved in terrorist activities (Bennel 2007), or studies that attempt to predict the spatial
distribution of terrorist cells in order to forecast terrorist risk and vulnerabilities (Schmidt 2007).
The most basic, and perhaps fundamental, capability of geospatial data and analysis is
visualization. Being able to see the data in the context of its location can offer insight into
patterns that may lead to new and potentially valuable observations and conclusions. GIS has
proved to be a very useful tool for visualizing spatial patterns of terrorist activities. There have
been studies involving the development of Graphical User Interfaces that make use of georeferenced terrorism data through automated visualization processes. These visualization
environments are developed to enable researchers to detect and explore patterns through the use
of new perspectives (Guo 2006). Another visualization software was developed in an effort to
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show the most fundamental concepts in analysis; known as the 5 W’s, these include who, what,
where, when, and why. The intention is that focusing on these aspects in a visual analytic system
will allow the large and complex datasets to be investigated with improved efficiency (Vilanova
2008). These studies have shown how visualization is important in the study of terrorism; so
naturally the mastery of this visualization is vital in portraying the data accurately and
effectively. A study of visualization methods for terrorism data resulted in cartographic
techniques to appropriately symbolize data lacking specific coordinates. This is an important step
that prevents falsely portraying the data’s geo-spatial location while still preserving and
displaying the attributes of the data (Jones, 2008). More elaborate visualization systems have
been developed to investigate space-time and multivariate patterns of data (Guo 2006); however,
the intention of systems like these is not specific towards the field of terrorism research and
therefore may need to be adapted before useful information can be extracted.
There have been numerous studies that have utilized spatial analysis techniques to
investigate terrorist activity (Bahgat and Medina 2013). These studies involve widely varying
geographic locations or extents and analysis techniques; additionally these studies consider and
focus on a diverse range of aspects of terrorism. Geographical studies in terrorism can range
from the study of a specific type of act, such as patterns within suicide bombings, to studies of
terrorist cell structures. An example of a study that focused on a single aspect of terrorism is a
study that employed geographic modeling techniques to forecast the spatial choice of suicide
bombers. The analysis technique combined mathematical modeling of environmental
characteristics and demographic features to predict locations of suicide bombings (Brown 2004).
The geographic hot spot analysis, commonly used in crime analysis, has also emerged as
a popular method of analyzing incidents of terrorism. Hot spot analysis is a technique to identify
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statically significant spatial clusters of a certain value. This Hot spot analysis has been used to
investigate transnational terrorism at the country level in order to assess future patterns
(Braithwaite 2007)
The structure of terrorist groups often exhibit patterns, these patterns can provide an
insight to how terrorist groups carry out their actions. A global investigation into the social
networks of terrorist groups used complex visualization and multi-agent modeling to analyze
interaction, proximity, and relocation of terrorist cells (Moon 2007). A study of terrorism
incidents and terrorist cell sites in Turkey was conducted by mapping cell locations and
calculating and analyzing the distance between cell sites and incident sites as well as the distance
from cell sites to other cell sites (Rossomo 2009). Terrorist network structures are a common
focus of spatial analysis as these networks are an important and complex systems of people,
finances, and technology arranged across space. One such study of terrorist networks addressed
these networks as systems composed of nodes that are connected by edges or links.
Classification and analysis of the nodes and links within the network can reveal patterns or
models of how terrorist networks are constructed (Medina 2008).
The temporal sequence involved in the planning and execution of terrorist activity is an
important aspect of terrorism research. Temporal aspects can be combined with spatial analysis
to improve pattern detection. An assessment of the spatio-temporal trends in terrorist incidents in
the United States, from 1970 to 2004 was conducted using data from the Global Terrorism
Database. The research aimed to examine the frequency and characteristics of domestic terrorist
attacks in order to conclude broad patterns with the geography of terrorism. The research looked
at weapon types, attack types, group types, and other characteristics (Webb 2009). Similar
research was done on the patterns of terrorist incidents in Iraq from 2004-2009. This research
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used GIS to understand spatial, social, political, and cultural triggers that influence incidents of
terrorism in order to inform counterterrorism efforts (Medina 2011). Another study involving an
assessment of temporal patterns involved research on terrorist attacks by the Spanish group ETA
between 1970 and 2007. The methodologies used resulted in spatial patterns as well as temporal
patterns, amongst other discoveries, the research found that against Madrid were unlikely to be
followed immediately by more attacks on Madrid or surrounding provinces (LaFree 2012).
Space-time clustering has also been used to investigate terrorism outbreaks. One investigation of
this nature involved detecting clusters of terrorist events at various time stamps; space-time
relationships between the clusters were investigated to detect terrorism outbreaks (Guo 2012).
Spatial technologies and techniques have been used not only for analysis of past events,
but also for prediction of future events. These studies can be invaluable for tactical and
preventative purposes. One study examined the use of kernel density estimation models for
predicting the next event in a criminal or terrorist event series. The temporal weights of the
events are determined by their influence. The methodology then attempts to predict the next
event location within the time series (Porter 2013).
More advanced techniques have been developed to model the effects of a terrorist attack
based on input conditions. The results produced by the models can be used to determine
appropriate foreign policy and emergency management practices; these models represent an
effort to discover the most effective methods of terrorism prevention and damage mitigation
(Das 2014).
Prevalence of terrorism is often studied in relation to other factors such as economic,
social, and political conditions in order to see what patterns may be revealed. A study of
terrorism in Turkey used geographically weighted regression (GWR) to examine spatial
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variations of terrorism and their relationships to external factors. The study concluded that
increases in income and schooling tend to reduce provincial terrorism while increases in
unemployment enhance terrorism (Yildirim 2013).
The recent wealth of literature on terrorist activities that utilizes geo-spatial analysis
techniques is a testament to their value and importance. Though there is an increasing amount of
research dedicated to the field of terrorism, it has been noted that there are a number of common
problems that persist in recent studies. Examples of these fallacies include failure to distinguish
among different types of terrorism, using the wrong units of analysis; failure to make these
considerations can affect the fundamentals of the results (Young 2011). It clear, however, that as
more research is conducted regarding terrorism and the patterns exhibited by terrorist groups, the
general public will be safer from the incidences of terrorism.
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III. Methodology
The study of terrorist planning cycles involves an investigation into the movement of
terrorist actors in time and space prior to the commission of the attack. The purpose of this study
is to investigate the possible presence of relationships or trends between the movements of
terrorists through both geographic space and time with relation to their ultimate target location
and attack time. These patterns can be investigated through an assessment of all recorded
terrorist attacks as a whole or through recorded terrorist attacks based on relevant variables, such
as terrorist group type or weapon type.
Time Space Signature Development
This investigation will involve the analysis and assessment of constructed time-space
signatures for recorded terrorist planning cycles. The signatures are represented on a line graph
where values on the horizontal (x) axis represent time in days before the attack and values on the
vertical (y) axis represent Euclidian distance in miles from the attack. The time value (x) and
distance value (y) combine to create a Cartesian coordinate. These Cartesian coordinates will all
be plotted on the same quadrant (Quadrant I) of a two dimensional Cartesian system as all of the
values are positive. There can be no negative values in time as all the records occur before the
attack and none occur after the attack. There can be no negative distances as all the distances are
calculated as positive distances between the incident and the attack. The cardinal direction
between the attack and the recorded incident is not necessary in this research as the study is only
concerned with the distance in relation to the target rather than the direction. Once the distance
and time between each preparatory incident and the ultimate attack are calculated, the coordinate
can be plotted on the Cartesian system. Once all of the incidents are plotted the graph will show
a series of points that tell the story of a terrorist plot or generalize a grouping of terrorist plots. It
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should be noted that the line of best fit representing the time signature for the set of points may
run into the negative space; this is due to the computation for the line and is not the result of
negative values.
Figure 1 below shows a clear example of a terrorist time space signature for an
Environmental terrorism incident. The coordinates represent the time and distance of preparatory
incidents from the time and location of the attack. The time and distance values increases as their
distance away from the origin (0,0) increases. The graph can be most easily read from right to
left. In this incident the earliest recorded incident, a surveillance mission, occurs a short distance
from the target while the following incidents, meetings, manufacturing, and travel, are recorded
at a greater distance from the target. The attack is then staged and executed at the origin (0,0), or
the time and place of the attack. The line of best fit, a loess type curve, is included to aid
visualization of the signature. The line of best fit helps to shows that recorded incidents of
planning for the attack began at a close proximity to the target, subsequently planning incidents
were moved a greater distance from the target, and finally the attack was commenced at the
target location. In addition, the confidence interval is shaded around the line of best fit.
The grey envelope, or confidence region, surrounding the loess smoothed fit curve in
Figure 1 represents the standard error. The standard error envelope is shown at a 95% confidence
interval in this analysis, meaning that the actual line falls within the interval at a 95% confidence
level. An increased confidence region represents a lack of data points and thus an uncertainty
regarding the actual position of the loess type curve. The degree of the polynomials used varied
depending on the dataset. The confidence regions were removed in a number of visualizations.
Overlapping confidence regions obstructed certain graphs with larger numbers of signatures; the
signatures could much more efficiently be visualized without the confidence regions.
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Figure 1. Example of Time-Space Signature for ELF Family Incident
The Time-Space signatures are constructed within R. R is a free software programming
language and environment used across disciplines for statistical analysis, computing, and
graphing. The user-created package ggplot2 enables data visualization within the R environment.
The incidents of terrorism as well as all the relative attributes are exported from the oracle
database as a master spreadsheet (.csv file). Individual files are derived from the master
spreadsheet where necessary. These files contain records based on relative categories; for
example, individual files are created for each of the four terrorist group types. This helps to
organize the data and makes it easier to graph, as unneeded records are removed before
attempting to plot.
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The data is then imported and read into R, and the ggplot2 package is activated within the
R environment. Various commands from the ggplot2 library are used to create plots and graphs.
The commands identify the data to be graphed and allow for the addition and removal of
graphing components, such as titles, regression lines, legends, etc.
Figure 2 below shows an example of scripting in R used to create a time space signature.
The first line defines the name of the graph object (i.e. IncidentPlot), the second line is the most
important of the commands as it identifies the dataset (Complete), and defines the fields to be
used as the x (DAYS) and y (DIST) values. This line also identifies the variable, or colour, that
the coordinates will be grouped by. In this example the variable is CATEGORY; this means that
the records will be grouped and plotted based on their terrorist category type. The following lines
contain commands that determine the components of the graph. In the order they appear, these
commands call for and define the inclusion of points, smoothed conditional mean line, title, xaxis label, y-axis label, legend, Cartesian coordinate limits. The final line instructs the program
to plot the newly created graph variable. There are additional commands that can be inserted to
change formatting and enable multi-plot faceting.
# Graph of all incidents by Category
IncidentsCategory <ggplot(Complete, aes( x=DAYS, y = DIST, colour = CATEGORY)) +
ggtitle(“Incidents by Category”)
geom_point(alpha=.3)
geom_smooth(alpha=.2, size=1) +
xlab("Time (days)") +
ylab("Distance (miles)") +
labs(colour = "Category") +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(-100,2500))
print(IncidentsCategory)
Figure 2. R Scripting for the Production of a Time-Space Signature
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The R code can be edited slightly to produce graphs for different datasets. All that is
required to produce a different graph is simple modification of the dataset name, color field, and
other components such as graph title.
Once produced, these graphs provide visualizations of the data that enables further
analysis of potential patterns in the time-space relationships between terrorist planning activities.
Commands and operations within R are used to plot the all the antecedent acts based on their
distance to the target location in miles and the time in days from the commission of incident. The
locations are plotted as points and a line of best fit derived from the data and displayed within the
same graph.
Time Space Signature Analysis
Time-Space Signatures can be created and analyzed for each individual terrorist plot as a
unique incident; however, the value of the time space signature analysis will be in the
investigation of generalized groups of terrorist incidents. More information can be realized by
grouping various time-space signatures based on categorized attributes of the recorded incidents.
Analyzing terrorist incidents based on existing groups and categories will be more effective in
determining overall patterns and generalizations that can describe terrorist activity on a more
broad scale. These broad scale assumptions can be used to describe how terrorists move in space
and time during the planning phase of their attack based on their group type as well as other
attributes of their attack.
The signatures were first grouped and graphed based on an attribute, called CATEGORY,
describing the terrorist category that the terrorist cell best fits in. The four categories used were
Environmental, Far Left, Far Right, and Islamic. Studies have shown that the various categories
of terrorist groups, classified most commonly by their political agenda, exhibit very
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distinguishable behaviors (Williams 2003). Terrorists have been grouped into four main
categories for research; these include the Right Wing Extremists, or Far Right, which include
groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), and Left Wing Extremists, or Far Left, which includes
groups such as Marxists orientations, Patronage and Special Interest Groups formed around a
single issue agenda, as well as Cults or Gangs (Camp 2000). Additionally, groups were created
for the Islamic Extremist terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, and Environmental Extremists, such
as the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF).
After the data was organized and separated by terrorist group type, the time-space
signatures were grouped and categorized based on a number of additional attribute factors. Each
terrorist category group was then assessed based on the attributes of the attack; these variables
include (1) case study (2) incident subtype (3) weapon type, (4) target type, and (5) incident ID.
To assess these variables, Time-Space Signatures were graphed in the same manner as described
above, however the records were grouped based on the attribute values within the selected
variable. Additionally, a line of best fit for each attribute group within the variable was plotted.
For example, Environmental Extremist incidents would be graphed based on Environmental
Extremist case studies; the graph would then show points classified based on each of the
attributed case studies (i.e. ELF Critter, ELF Family, ALF Davis, etc).
Visualizing the time-space signatures based on various attributes can potentially reveal
additional information and insights. While plotting incidents based on the case study and incident
ID will aid analysis by showing a line of best fit for incidents and case studies. Plotting incidents
base on incident subtype, weapon type, and target type can be useful in showing if attacks
committed with similar agendas or similar weapon types exhibit similar planning cycles. Once
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generated, these Time-Space signature lines can be compared and analyzed in search
characteristics that distinguish the various categories of planning cycles.
Distribution of Spatial and Temporal Values Analysis
In addition to the analysis of the Time-Space Signatures, analysis will be conducted on the
distribution of values representing temporal and spatial locations involved in the terrorist
planning cycles. A statistical summary will be calculated for the values in each of the four
terrorist categories (Environmental, Far Right, Far Left, and Islamic). The statistical summary
will include calculations for the (1) minimum, (2) 1st quartile, (3) median, (4) mean, (5) 3rd
quartile, and (6) maximum. A set of figures will be calculated for the attribute values
representing the amount of days between the planning event and the time of the attack (DAYS)
as well as the attribute value representing the number of miles between the planning event and
the location of the attack (DIST). The statistical summary can be easily calculated within the R
programming language environment. Figure 3 below shows the scripting involved in the
calculation of a statistical summary. Line 2 reads in the dataset while Line 4 generates a
summary of the dataset. Summaries of all of the columns within the dataset are then shown
within the console of the R software interface.
# Import Environment csv
Environment = read.csv(Environment.csv') # Environment Category
# Generate Summary of Environment csv
summary(Environment)
Figure 3. R Scripting for the Calculation of a Statistical Summary
The distribution of values will also be plotted in a histogram in order to aid visualization
of the distribution of values. The process for creating the histogram within R is shown in Figure
4. The first section involves creating a variable that contains only the column of values to be
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included in the histogram, in this case the distance variables. The next section includes
calculating the mean, quartile breaks, and medians from the dataset. These variables will be used
when plotting the histogram. The third section includes the scripting that produces the histogram
while the fourth and final section contains scripting to add mean, quintile, and median lines.
# Create variable edist for Environmental Distance values
edist = Environment$INC_TO_ANT_DIST
summary(edist)
# Calculate dataset statistics
edistm = mean(edist) # Calculate mean
edistq = quantile(edist) # Calculate quantiles
edistmed = median(edist) # Calculate median
# Create Histogram
e_dist = hist(edist, breaks = "Sturges", col="grey", main="Distribution of Environment
Distance Values", xlab="Distance (miles)") +
xfit = seq(min(edist),max(edist),length=40)
yfit = dnorm(xfit,mean=mean(edist),sd=sd(edist))
yfit = yfit*diff(e_dist$mids[1:2])*length(edist)
# Add lines for dataset statistics
lines(xfit, yfit, col="red", lwd=2)
abline(v = edistm, col = "blue", lwd = 4)
abline(v = edistq, col = "darkgreen", lwd = 2)
abline(v = edistmed, col = "darkgreen", lwd = 4)
Figure 4. R Scripting for the Construction of Histograms
The statistical summaries and histograms were be calculated for the time and distance
variable for each of the four categories. These summaries and histograms provide a numerical
insight into where planning activities occur in time and space in relation to the attack.
Statistical summaries were also calculated to assess the temporal and spatial distribution
of events at the start of a terrorist planning cycle. To accomplish this, the earliest event in each
incident was transferred to a new excel document and split up by category. The 1st quartile,
median, mean, 3rd quartile, and maximum value were calculated for each of the four datasets and
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summarized in a table. The tables were then assessed to see if there were any patterns in where
terrorist plot planning was initiated in relation to time from the attack and distance from the
target.
Database
The ATS Database was used as the foundation for this research. The American Terrorism
Study (ATS) has been in development for over 25 years and is supported by a large number of
persons and institutions. The drive for the ATS was due to the lack of a sufficient database from
which empirical terrorism research could be conducted. The ATS began in 1989 when the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a list of individuals indicted as a result of
investigation under the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program. The FBI subsequently released a series
of lists including indicted individuals from later time periods. The lists contained information on
numerous terrorists from a wide range of terrorist groups. The Terrorism Research Center (TRC)
in Fulbright College at the University of Arkansas was established in 2003 to conduct research
on terrorism and continues to build from the ATS foundation. Information regarding individuals
indicted for acts of terrorism continues to be extracted from court case documents and coded into
the ATS database.
The ATS database, an Oracle relational database housed at the University of Arkansas, is
composed of two primary components. The first component is comprised of demographic, group,
and legal data extracted from federal court case documents. The second component is geospatial
and temporal data associated with pre-cursor activities and incidents that are associated and
contained within the court case records.
Within the database, each terrorist attack is organized as a sequence of precursor
preparatory acts that lead up to the final attack. Each record of a precursor act contains attributes
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describing their distance in miles and time in days from the ultimate attack. Each record also
contains the terrorist group type, weapon type, target type, and incident subtype. A complete list
of variables and descriptions included in the dataset used in the analysis can be found in
Appendix A.
The longitude and latitude of the precursor attacks is calculated through a geocoder
included in Oracle Spatial. The coordinates are calculated based on the smallest address
component. The centroid of an area is used for incomplete addresses, such as records that only
contain a city name. The linear distance from the attack to the preparatory act is calculated
through the Oracle Spatial database toolset.
The records within the database are organized depending on the incident they belong to.
The Incident ID identifier is the smallest unit of organization and it represents a single act of
terrorism as a unique act, such as a bombing or assassination. Each Incident consists of
Antecedent Activities, or activities identified as precursor behaviors associated with the terrorist
incident. These Antecedent Activities are further broken down into Preparatory Activities and
Ancillary Activities. Preparatory activities are Antecedent Acts committed by individuals that are
tied to the preparation for a terrorist incident while Ancillary Activities are both criminal and
non-criminal acts committed by terrorist for order maintenance, internal security, or personal
reasons. A bank robbery could be considered a preparatory activity or an ancillary activity
depending on the motivation. If the bank robbery was committed to gain funds to directly
support an attack, it can be considered a Preparatory Activity. If the bank robbery was committed
as part of the group’s general agenda without direct support of an attack, it can be considered an
Ancillary Activity. It is important to note that individual antecedent activities can be attributed to
multiple incidents if the activity was conducted in support of multiple terrorist plots. For
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example, a bank robbery could be included in multiple incidents if the funds were used to
support multiple attacks.
The Case Study is a larger unit of terrorist incident organization. The Case Study is
recorded terrorist activity that pertains to one or more terrorist incidents that have the same group
of persons involved. A case study can consist of a terrorist subgroup; for example, case studies
within the environmental terrorism category would be divided between ELF Critter, ELF family,
and other ELF cells, instead of being grouped together in one group with all ELF activity.
Data Selection
One of the most common ways of organizing data relating to terrorism is through the use
of existing terrorist categories. These categorized groups of terrorist actors are generally based
on the similarities between terrorist ideologies and motivations. The four categories used in this
research were (1) Environmental, (2) Far-Left, (3) Far-Right, and (4) Islamic Extremist. These
are four generally acknowledged terrorism categories and are four of the six categories defined in
the ATS database. Two categories of terrorism, including Nationalist/Separatist and Single Issue,
were removed from this research, as there were only 56 and 13 records respectively for each of
the categories. The number of records within each category of terrorism can be seen in Figure 5
below. The ATS Records column indicates the number of record within the ATS database that
have geocoded locations while the Selected ATS Records indicate the number of records within
the various categories that were used in the analysis.
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Environmental
Far-Left
Far-Right
Islamic Extremist
Total

ATS Records
373
394
343
385
1495

Selected ATS Records
257
341
307
379
1284

Figure 5. ATS Records and Selected ATS Records Included in the Analysis
The geographic distribution of the data records used in the analysis is shown in Figure 6
below. This map identifies the context of where the incidents are occurring throughout the
United States.

Figure 6. Map Showing Terrorist Planning Incidents by State (1976-2010)
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Data selection was based on the nature of the recorded Incident, as the Incident is the
smallest organization or grouping of terrorist activity. If an incident was removed from the
dataset it would be removed from all analysis within the study. The records that were removed
from the database prior to the analysis include incidents, identified by their Incident ID, that did
not contain a considerable time-space series within their planning cycle; examples of these
incidents include vandalisms, such as spray-painting, that did not require a significant or
measureable amount planning. Additionally, the inclusion of these types of incidents would
prevent successful graphing of the datasets through the ggplot2 package within R. Incidents that
contain less than three records, or less than three x-y coordinate locations produced errors in the
graphing process. A limited number of records or x-y locations within an incident results in an
error for the computation of a loess-smoothed line; however, when a specific Incident ID
consisted of more than three records, the series would plot along with the loess-smoothed line.
The removal of the described incidents from the database not only allows the data to be graphed
without error, but it also produces a dataset that better represents terrorist time-space planning
cycles in general as incidents that do not contain substantial planning activity are not included.
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IV. Discussion and Results
Individuals or groups who advocate their political ideologies and agendas through the use
of various forms of violence against governments or the general public are considered to be
terrorists (Weinberg, 2003). Though the terrorist crimes committed may seem senseless and
delusional to the general public, terrorist plots are in fact generally conceived through rational
though processes with the goal of achieving specific strategic objectives (Nance, 2008). Due to
the methodical nature of most terrorist plots, data representing various terrorist plots that have
occurred in the United States can be used to identify patterns and trends in terrorist planning
cycles. The analysis of space-time signatures for terrorist planning cycles shows is included for
all terrorist categories, and subsequently each of the four main terrorist categories. Qualitative
research into the categories is included alongside the description of the Time-Space Signatures in
order to explain possible patterns observed.
All Terrorist Categories
Terrorist attacks are most commonly premeditated and thoroughly planned. The planning
phase is recognized as an important process for minimizing risk and ensuring success and
impact. Terrorist attacks are designed to convey and spread the beliefs and opinions of the group
and ideally force a political or social change that will strive towards their ideological goal
(Hoffman 1998). Terrorists and terrorist groups occupy a wide spectrum of political ideologies
and employ a variety of tactics, targets selections, and weapon choices; despite these differences;
all recorded incidents of terrorism can be analyzed for patterns in regards to their planning cycles
as a single group of criminal actors.
Though there is no universal model for terrorist attacks, the planning cycle has been
generalized into a series of steps that describe how terrorist actors move in time and space prior
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to an attack (Stratfor 2012). The generalized method used for terrorist attacks has been simplified
into a process involving seven stages in the military training handbook titled A Military Guide to
Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. The stages of a terrorist attack are varied through other
sources, however they follow a similar pattern. The general theory regarding terrorist planning
cycle stages suggest that terrorists select a target, conduct surveillance and planning, and then
execute the attack. The seven sages can be seen in Figure 7 below while the descriptions of the
stages follow.

Broad Target
Selection
Escape and
Evasion

Intelligence &
Surveillance

Actions on
Objective
(Attack)

Specific Target
Selection

Pre-attack
Surveillance &
Planning

Attack Rehearsal

Figure 7. The Seven Stages of a Terrorist Attack
The first step of the terrorist planning cycle is known as Target Selection; this step
involves determining prospective targets pursuant to the ideology of the group. Information on
prospective targets is gathered through the use of information from the media and other sources
(United States et al. 2005). This step is often conducted at a location remote from the potential
targets to avoid detection. The next series of steps involve more detailed planning for the attack.
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The second step of the process is known as Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance. This
step involves recording and gathering information on a selection of potential targets at the target
site. Information gathered can involve noticeable routines, transportation, and security (United
States et al. 2005). The surveillance can involve observations into the strengths and weaknesses
of the security at the target location, including direct contact or questioning with personnel.
Information is often recorded in various forms including pictures, maps, and notes (NYS Office
of Counter Terrorism 2014).
The third step of the process is known as Specific Target Selection. In this step, the
ultimate target is determined if it was previously unselected from a larger collection of targets.
Factors including the attack audience, media response, and message portrayed, are all assessed in
order to establish the target (United States et al. 2005).
The fourth step of the attack process is called Pre-Attack Surveillance and Planning. This
is effectively a second round of surveillance that provides more details about the target and
generates more information regarding patterns and processes at the target site. Certain aspects of
the attack begin to be established and tested including near by safe houses, entrance plans, and
escape routes (United States et al. 2005). This process can also involve funding and supply
acquisition. Attempts for funding can involve criminal activity that is not pursuant to the ideas of
the group but is seen as a necessary in order to carry out the objective; funding can be derived
through smuggling, theft, robbery, and sales of goods.
The next stage of the attack is known as Rehearsals, also known as dry runs or trial runs.
This stage includes detailed planning and training for the attack. The goal of this phase is to
eliminate the chance of failure and ensure that the attack will go through as planned. This phase
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involves testing the plan and escape routes, as much as possible, in order to identify flaws and
determine if final adjustments need to be made.
The next step, and perhaps the most important step of the attack, is called Actions on the
Objective, or Deployment and Attack. During this phase, equipment and personnel are put in
position and attack is executed following the predetermined plan. Though careful planning
enables for a success, mistakes made during this phase will ultimately prevent or limit the
success of an attack. It is suggested that if the attack reaches this phase, and the plan has been
developed with detail and thorough information, the attack is beyond prevention (United States
et al. 2005).
The final step is called Escape and Evasion. Following the actions on the target, the
terrorist attempt their escape, if escape is included in the plan (United States et al. 2005). The
escape often involves the retreating to a predetermined safe house that is not easily detected
(Nance 2008). This step can also involve attempts to exploit the effects of their attack through
the media or other venues in order to push the agenda of the attackers.
The space-time movement of terrorists during a terrorist plot is easy to extrapolate from
the process listed above. It would seem that the terrorists determine a target from a remote
location. Following the determination of a location, terrorists move closer to the target
temporarily to gather intelligence through surveillance. After information is gathered, the
terrorists return to the remote location in order to plan and prepare for the attack while acquiring
funds and supplies. Finally the terrorists return to the target location for a final time to execute
the attack.
Figure 8 below shows a theorized time-space signature for the terrorist attack cycle based
on the full seven-step terrorist attack described in the Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty
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First Century. The graph shows how the terrorist resides at a distance away from the target but
visits the target on multiple occasions to conduct surveillance, attack rehearsals, and ultimately
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Figure 8. Theorized Time-Space Signature for Terrorist Attacks (3 Target Visits)
Figure 9 below shows a similar representation of a theorized time-space signature for a
terrorist attack. In this representation, the terrorist has the target identified prior to initiating the
attack and visits it once for surveillance and a second time for an attack rehearsal before
committing the attack. This graph reveals how a slightly different attack sequence can change the
structure of the time-space signature.

34

Distance (miles)

Theorized Time-Space Signature for Terrorist Attack
(2 Visits Before Attack)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

20

40

60
Time (days)

80

100

120

Figure 9. Theorized Time-Space Signature for Terrorist Attacks (2 Target Visits)
It is important to note the limitations of these terrorist attack sequence theories and their
model Time-Space Signatures. Though these attack sequences theories have been developed
based on general observations of terrorist plots, they lack the use of large-scale datasets
containing geo-spatial records for terrorist movement. Additionally, they seem to illustrate a
back and fourth movement between a safe house and the target location without providing much
information on travel for supplies acquisition, recruitment, or funding operations. In general
these representations show that terrorists begin from a remote location and visit their attack site
prior to the ultimate attack.
Figure 10 below shows the actual Time-Space Signature for terrorist planning cycles is
represented by a line of best fit for the selected ATS data. The graph does seem to have some
similarities with the theorized time-space signature shown in Figure 8 and 9 above. The figure
shows that the planning activities begin at a far distance from the target before approaching the
target for the first time. Following the first visit to the target the planning activities occur at a
more remote location from the target and once again approach the target before returning again
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to a more remote location. The activities then ultimately approach the target and conclude at the
attack.

Figure 10. Time-Space Signature for Terrorist Planning Cycles
Though Figure 10 above is useful for demonstrating the general trend in all terrorist
planning activities, it fails to recognize the difference between identified categories of terrorists.
Figure 11 below shows all of the terrorist activities plotted and grouped based on the terrorist
category they belong to. The four terrorist categories are each fitted with their own line of best fit
as a representation of their average movement in time and space. Figure 11 illustrates that the
four terrorist categories each have unique time-space signatures and thus unique planning cycles.
In particular this graph reveals that the four different terrorist categories have noticeably
different temporal durations for their planning cycles. It appears that environmental terrorist
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groups have the shortest planning cycles by far, while the Far-Left and Far-Right terrorist groups
have the longest planning cycles; the Islamic Extremist planning cycle is represented as the
second largest of the planning cycles.

Figure 11. Time-Space Signature for All Incidents by Category
While Figure 11 is useful for showing relative temporal differences between terrorist
planning cycles, the graphic representation can be improved to show spatial movement over
time. Figure 12 shows the time-space signatures plotted in in individual graphs; this method is
useful for assessing the difference in spatial movement over time. The Environmental time-space
signature represents activity near the target long before the attack, followed by activity at a
remote location prior the attack, and finally, heavy activity near the target directly before the
attack. The Far-Left time-space signature seems to represent constant activity at a close
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proximity from the target throughout the attack planning cycle. The Far-Right signature shows
activity occurring gradually closer to the target as the time from the attack decreases; this curve
also shows concentrated activity at a close proximity to the target directly prior to the attack. The
Islamic Extremist signature generally reveals a decreasing distance between activity and the
target as the attack approaches.

Figure 12. Time-Space Signature for All Incidents by Category
Through these initial assessments, it becomes clear that terrorist activities within each of
these four classifications exhibit unique, or at least different, planning cycles. The general
statements offer an introduction into how the signatures can be described. The individual terrorist
categories and their signatures will be assessed in detail in the following sections.
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Environmental Extremist
In recent history, environmental extremist movements have emerged in attempt to
advance environmental protection beyond the current pace and scope; these movements often
encourage and even employ criminal activity to send their message and achieve their goals
(Michael 2013). The common thread between environmental extremist groups is a belief in
biocentrism, a philosophy that removes human beings from the philosophical center of the world
(Liddick 2006). This category of terrorism is recognized as its own group due to the diversity in
political alignment; though environmental welfare movements are generally identified as being
on the political left, there have been historical movements that have roots in fascist ideologies of
the political Right (Michael, 2013).
Environmental movements generally target individuals and entities that are perceived to
commit actions compromising the welfare of animals and the environment, as well as those with
ties to the aforementioned companies. The goal of these organizations is to organize direct
actions that inflict economic damage perceived offenders and ultimately cause changes in policy
and society (Liddick 2006). Two well-known and active Environmental Extremist groups are
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and its sister organization Animal Liberation Front (ALF). These
groups have conducted attacks on research facilities and laboratories, farming operations,
construction companies, fast-food restaurants, and other institutions that are perceived as
proponents of unsustainable environmental actions (Liddick 2006). The attacks, resulting in
millions of dollars in damage, range from vandalism to arson and are intended to harass,
intimidate, and cause economic damage to the target (United States et al. 2008). The prevalence
and impact of these attacks, combined with the preference for arson as an attack technique has
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established environmental extremists as the No. 1 domestic terror concern (United States et al.
2007).
The structure of environmental extremist groups has an inherent impact on their
preparatory activities. ELF and ALF are both considered below ground organizations that have
no official or formal leadership, membership, and central organization. Members of this
organization gather in small autonomous cells consisting of two to five persons (Michael 2013).
ELF and ALF members remain anonymous to the public and other members in order to protect
their identity, avoid detection, and prolong their activities (Liddick 2006). Additionally,
remaining autonomous allows for above ground organizations with similar agendas, including
PETA and the Earth First! Foundation, to maintain plausible deniability in their relationship to
these cells and their direct actions.
The planning cycle of Environmental Extremist groups generally involves target
selection, planning, and attack. This approach can be best identified and examined through
guides released to existing and potential members on the ideologies and strategies of a group,
such as The Alf Primer. Though The Alf Primer is a document for ALF members, its content is
applicable to all below ground environmental activist organizations, including ALF’s brother
organization ELF. The Alf Primer contains information on the history and ideologies of ALF as
well as a guide for how to commit a direct action in support of ALF’s mission. The primer
outlines the planning of an attack in a series of steps. The first step of a direct action is target
selection; in this step the ALF member selects an establishment that is perceived to be an animal
abuser. The primer advises selecting a target that is outside of the attackers immediate area. The
second step of a direct action is planning. This step includes visiting the site, studying the roads
and environment, and conducting surveillance. A second visit is conducted following the
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construction of a detailed scheme for the attack; during this visit to the target a simulation of the
attack is performed in a run-through. Once the planning, preparation, and training are finalized,
the attack is executed. The primer also lists preparation considerations, such as the use of a safe
house, proper attire, and detection prevention. The document details how to commit specific
attacks ranging from gluing locks and painting windows to arson and animal liberations.
Figure 13 below shows the signature for all Environmental Extremist incidents. The
signature shows that activity towards the beginning of the planning cycle is at a close proximity
to the target. The activity then becomes more remote as time before the attack decreases. Finally,
directly prior to the attack the activity is concentrated near the target. The general pattern seems
to support the idea that a plot may involve initial surveillance at the target location, followed by
planning and preparation at a distant location, and ultimately the attack at the target location.

Figure 13. Time-Space Signature for Environmental Incidents
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Figure 14 shows a data summary for the time values contained within the entire
Environmental dataset. The data summary for the time attribute shows that the mean activity
took place around two months prior to the attack (57.59 days), while the median activity took
place around 19 days prior to the attack. The low median value indicates that environmental
attacks involve a greater proportion of activity directly prior to the attack. It could also indicate
that the types of attacks, such as vandalisms, assaults, and possibly even arson, carried out by
environmental activists may not require lengthy and detailed planning.
Distribution of
Environment Time Values
Time
(days)
Min
0.00
1st Quartile
9.00
Median
19.00
Mean
57.59
3rd Quartile
93.00
Max
329.00
Figure 14. Distribution of Environmental Time Values
The histogram in Figure 15 below shows the distribution of the environmental time
values. The histogram represents a right skewed distribution. The bottom half of values are very
close in time to the time of the attack, indicating that activities increasingly occur directly prior
to the incident and do not appear even distributed over time.
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Figure 15. Histogram for Distribution of Environmental Time Values
The distance summary for the environmental dataset is shown in Figure 16. While the
mean value is a large distance of 524.442 miles, likely influenced by a high max value of
2443.247, the median distance is only 23.165, indicating that the planning and preparation for
environmental incidents are occurring at a very close proximity to the target. This low distance
median value shows that environmental extremists are attacking targets near their planning areas.
This could represent a high amount of activity near the location of the attack, such as
surveillance, but it could also indicate that these terrorists may be attacking targets within their
immediate area.
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Distribution of Environment
Distance Values
Time (days)
Min
0.00
1st Quartile
9.00
Median
19.00
Mean
57.59
3rd Quartile
93.00
Max
329.00
Figure 16. Distribution of Environmental Distance Values
The histogram in Figure 17 below shows the distribution of the environmental distance
values described above. The histogram represents a right skewed distribution and illustrates that
the majority of activities are occurring within a close proximity of the target.

Figure 17. Histogram for Distribution of Environmental Distance Values
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Figure 18 shows a summary of the first recorded preparatory act in each of Incidents; the
first record for each incident was determined by identifying the record with the highest number
of days between the event and the attack. The table shows that the average attack planning began
around three months (128 days) prior to the attack, the median falls very close to the mean at 108
days. The table also shows that the median distance of initial activity is 1.5 miles from the target,
showing that a large portion of planning begins near the target, possibly in surveillance or target
selection meetings. The mean value, however, is 406.64, largely influenced by the maximum
value, and shows that there are incidents where planning begins remotely, at venues such as
national meetings.
Environmental Incidents Initial Act
Summary
Time (days) Distance (miles)
Min.
7.000
0.00
1st Qu.
61.000
0.00
Median
108.000
1.50
Average
128.385
406.64
3rd Qu.
223.000
198.99
Max.
329.000
2443.25
Figure 18. Distribution of Values for Initial Acts in Environmental Incidents
Figure 19 below shows the signatures for all of the Environmental Extremist Incidents.
The plot shows the diversity in temporal length and spatial extent of environmental planning
activities. While certain incidents involve a larger timeframe for planning, including three that
involve over 200 days, the majorities involve less than 150 days for preparation. It is also
noticeable that the incident planning cycles contain a number of different time- signature shapes.
There are lines that appear to be constant in distance from the target over time, while others
distances from the target appear to change noticeably over time throughout the planning cycle.
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Figure 19. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Incident ID
Figure 20 below shows each incident plotted individually. This display does not show
easily convey relativity between incidents however it more clearly shows the shape of each
signature; in doing so this figure shows the diversity between environmental extremist planning
cycles. Incidents 53340, 53366, and 53409 show little change in distance from the target over
time and are represented by stable lines. Incidents 50239, 50333, 53385, and 53450 show initial
activity close to the target followed by activity at an increased distance from the target, and
finally, activity near the target. Incidents 6720 and 6722 are concave down graphs showing
activity at a decreasing distance from the target over time. In general there seems to be a gradual
curve that approaches the attack; the planning cycles seem to begin at a close distance to the
target before moving a greater distance away and ultimately returning to the target.
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Figure 20. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Incident ID

Figure 21 below shows the Environmental Incidents by Case Study. In this graph various
incidents are grouped if the same actors commit them. The graph largely exhibits characteristics
described above, including variety in temporal and spatial extents of planning activities. ELF
Critter and ELF Schoppert do not appear to have any activity at a distance remote from their
target while ELF Family and ELF 3 engage in activity at great distances away from their target.

Figure 21. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Case Study
Figure 22 below shows the same signatures as shown above in Figure 21, however, the
curves are plotted individually. With the exception of the ELF Critter case study, all of the
incidents appear to approach the target as the time to the attack decreases. Theses graphs also
show activity at a remote distance from the target prior to approaching the target for the attack.
In this visualization, the ELF Family and ELF Schoppert planning cycles appear to exhibit
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similar patterns, however the relative scale differences, shown in Figure 21 above, indicates the
actual differences.

Figure 22. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Case Study
The planning cycles for various environmental Incident Subtypes are shown in Figure 23.
Represented on this graph are bombing/explosions and facility/infrastructure attack. Instructions
for attacks such as these are described in manuals such as The Alf Primer, other attacks described
in the manual, such as vandalism and assaults, are likely not included due to their lack of
planning efforts. The figure shows that while the bombing/explosion attacks involved remote
planning activities, the facility/infrastructure attacks seem to involve planning activity close to
the target. There doesn’t appear to be a substantial difference in temporal scales between the
various Incident Subtypes.

49

Figure 23. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Incident Subtype
The planning cycles for environmental incidents based on their incident subtype are
shown on individual plots below in Figure 24. The graph shows the same patterns and trends as
Figure 23 above. While the bombing/explosions are planned and prepared for remotely, the
facility/infrastructure attacks are planned and prepared for in close proximity to the target. Figure
24 also helps to show the inconsistent pattern in planning activity directly prior to the attack.

50

Figure 24. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Incident Subtype
The signatures for environmental terrorists by the weapon type used in the attack are
shown in Figure 25 below. This graph is the same as Figure 24 above, showing the planning
cycles based on Incident Subtype. This is due to the fact that the bombing/explosion attacks used
explosives as their weapon type while facility/infrastructure attacks used incendiary weapon
types. The patterns and observations are the same as observed through Figure 23 and Figure 24.
Though it is logical, it is interesting to note how directly the weapon type is connected to the
incident subtype.
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Figure 25. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Weapon Type
Figure 26 below, showing the signatures for environmental incidents by weapon type,
represents the same curves as Figure 25 above, indicating the correlation between weapon type
and incident subtype.
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Figure 26. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Weapon Type
Figure 27 below shows the environmental incidents by target type. The temporal and
spatial patterns observed in the figure below are almost the same as the patterns observed in
Figure 26 above. It shows that the attack of the government target involved planning beginning
at a distant location before approaching the target while the planning for the attack on the NGO
or business target involved planning at a short distance from the target.
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Figure 27. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Target Type
Figure 28 below shows the environmental incidents by target type. There are slight
differences between the curves for the figures showing the incidents by weapon type and incident
subtype; however, the graphs appear to show the same general patterns. While the Government
targets were attacked with explosives, the NGO or business targets were attacked with incendiary
devices.
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Figure 28. Time-Space Signatures for Environmental Incidents by Target Type
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Far-Left
Far-Left terrorist organizations are categorized by their desire to initiate revolution
through the overthrowing of capitalist systems or government control. Far-Left terrorists often
propagate a class based or ethno-national agenda as a motivation for their political violence; their
ideas are often rooted in Marxist or communist ideals (Hoffman 1998). The target of the violence
is commonly an oppressive system, class, or government entity. Far-Left groups consider their
actions to be beneficial to the poor or oppressed and herald themselves as supporters of the
subjugated (Martin, 2011). Attacks from the Far-Left generally involved bombings and assaults
on individuals, groups, or infrastructure that are important to the opposition. Examples of FarLeft groups include Puerto Rican independence groups, such as the Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña (FALN), African American separatist groups, including the
New African Freedom Fighters, and American Marxist or communist groups, such as United
Freedom Front (UFF).
Similar to other acts of terrorism, plots of Far-Left terrorism generally involve target
selection, surveillance, procurement of supplies and funds, prior to the attack. Far-Left incidents
of terrorism are suggested to be symbolic in nature. They are designed to call attention to a
specific political call and avoid collateral damage to individuals that could become supporters.
Their actions are called ‘armed propaganda’ due to their symbolic and educational intent
(Hoffman 1993). Terrorist plots are designed to destroy existing structures or order in the name
of the poor and downtrodden (Martin 2011).
Though the actions of Far-Left groups were prominent through the 80s and 90s, attacks
from these groups have since decreased and are uncommon. Despite the infrequency of actions
from the Far-Left in contemporary society, it is still valuable to study their actions as a
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contribution to the understanding of terrorism as a whole. The majority of recorded Far-Left
incidents within the ATS database include incidents of bombing, murder, and assault.
Figure 29 below shows the time-space signature for Far-Left terrorist planning cycles.
The general trend shows a stable and flat line with a very gradual increase followed by a very
gradual decrease. It appears that the actions occur with a close, but fluctuating, proximity to the
target.

Figure 29. Time-Space Signatures for All Far Left Incidents
The table in Figure 30 below shows a summary for the temporal values in the Far-Left
dataset. It shows that the far left median incident occurs almost a year from the attack at 335
days. The mean value for the time at which incidents occur is at 446.40 days. Both of these
values are relatively large indicating that the planning cycles for Far-Left incidents involve long
time periods.
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Distribution of Far Left
Time Values
Time (days)
Min
0.00
1st Quartile
92.00
Median
335.00
Mean
446.40
3rd Quartile
668.00
Max
1810.00
Figure 30. Distribution of Far Left Time Values
The histogram shown in Figure 31 illustrates the distribution of time values in the Far-Let
Dataset. The distribution is skewed to the right, however the quintiles are spread throughout the
dataset and less clustered towards the time of the attack. The distribution shows a relatively
stable decline towards the right extreme indicating that the time values are generally present
throughout the spectrum. Though there is a noticeably high presence of activity close to the time
of the attack, the activities do seem to occur outside of time periods directly prior to the attack.

Figure 31. Histogram for Distribution of Far Left Time Values
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The distribution of distance values in the Far-Left dataset is summarized in Table 32
below. The median distance for preparatory and planning activities is rather low at 16.974
indicating that a large portion of these activities occurs within a close proximity of the target.
The mean value for distances between the target and the planning activity is larger, at 157.782
miles. The large difference between the median value of 16.974 and the mean of 157.782
indicates that the mean is influenced by the maximum value of 1191.450 and other large outlier
values.
Distribution of Far Left
Distance Values
Distance (miles)
Min
0.000
1st Quartile
3.692
Median
16.974
Mean
157.782
3rd Quartile
190.068
Max
1191.450
Figure 32. Distribution of Far Left Distance Values
The distribution curve for the Far Left distance values is shown below in Figure 33. The
histogram shows a right skewed curve with the bottom half of values at a very close distance to
the target. Additionally, the bottom third of values all fall within a relatively close distance of the
target and the top quartile is spread over a large range of distance values. This distribution shows
that the far left terrorist activities seem to be concentrated within a short distance of the target.
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Figure 33. Histogram for Distribution of Far Left Distance Values
The Far-Left extent summary shown in Figure 34 below shows the summary statistics for
the first recorded activities in each of the Far-Left incidents. These statistics give a description of
where the terrorist plots begin in time and space relative to their target. The temporal summary
shows that the bottom quarter of attacks begin just seven days before the attack, while the bottom
half of incidents begin less than 94 days from the attack, and the bottom third begins less than
260 days from the attack. This indicates that while the attacks can require planning of more than
three months, there are attacks that can be planned and carried out in less than one week. The
distance summary shows that these attacks generally begin at a larger distance from the target.
The minimum distance is 37 while the median is much higher at 687. This is a clear indication
that these events generally begin their planning cycle remotely before they are executed.
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Far Left Incidents Initial Act Summary
Time (days) Distance (miles)
Min.
3.15
37.000
1st Qu.
7.03
435.000
Median
93.45
687.000
Average
274.87
865.220
3rd Qu.
258.46
1242.000
Max.
1181.14
1810.000
Figure 34. Distribution of Values for Initial Acts in Far Left Incidents
The planning cycles for the Far-Left incidents are graphed below in Figure 35 based on
their Incident ID. The high number of incidents, and their great variation in patterns and extents,
makes this graph difficult to interpret. It is apparent that though there are incidents that have flat
lines indicating limited spatial movement over time, many of the lines are show a fluctuation in
time and space in the planning cycle, indicating considerable movement in both space and time.

Figure 35. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Incident ID
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The signatures for Far Left incidents are shown individually in Figure 36 and 37 below.
This method of data presentation identifies that the majority of the incidents involved a retreat to
a remote location after a visit to the approximate area of the target. There are around 13 of the 41
graphs where this trend is not clearly visible. This pattern is likely indicative of a surveillance or
reconnaissance operation to obtain information about the target. The signatures also show
movement between the target location and a more remote location in a number of graphs. This
pattern seems to indicate that activities occur at a range of locations in relationship to the target.
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Figure 36. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Incident ID – First Set
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Figure 37. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Incident ID – Second Set

The Far Left incidents are shown below in Figure 38 graphed according to their case
study. The figure shows that the Japanese Red Army and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Nacional employ shorter planning and preparatory cycles, while the other five Far Left case
studies involve planning and preparation activities beyond 500 days prior to the attack. Figure 38
also shows the difference in planning cycle movement. While the Yahweh group, New African
Freedom Fighters, and Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional remain at a close proximity to
their target locations, other groups, including the Frente Revolucionario Boricua and the May 19
Communist Order facilitate planning and preparation activities at locations very remote from
their target.

Figure 38. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Case Study
The Far Left incidents are graphed individually in Figure 39 below. The figure shows the
diversity in space-time movement of actors within these case studies. While three of the case
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studies exhibit a stable signature, two signatures appear to approach the target from an area
distant to the target.

Figure 39. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Case Study
Figure 40 shows the Far Left incidents graphed by case study. The figure shows that the
various incident subtypes include incidents of similar lengths; all incident subtypes include
incidents with planning cycles of over 1000 days. Additionally, this figure shows that Far Right
planning for Facility/Infrastructure attacks and Armed Assault attacks occur near to the target
location throughout the planning cycle. Planning activities for Far Right Bombing/Explosion
attacks fluctuate greatly in their location relative to the target throughout the planning cycle.
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Figure 40. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Incident Subtype
The Far Left incidents are shown in Figure 41 based on their relative incident subtype on
individual plots below. This figure supports the same observations determined in Figure 40
above. While the Armed Assault and Facility/Infrastructure Attacks involve planning activities
close to the target, the Bombing/Explosion attacks vary in their proximity to the target. All
signature lines for the three incident subtypes do appear to be relatively flat and do not show
distinctive change in position over time.
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Figure 41. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Incident Subtype
Far Left incidents are shown graphed by their Weapon Type in Figure 42 below. The
graph has noticeable similarities with Figures 40 and 41 above, as the weapon type is likely to
correspond to the incident subtype. Incidents involving melee and firearms together represent the
signature for Armed Assault in Figure 40. Additionally, Explosives correspond to the signature
for Bombing/Explosion while Incendiary devices correspond to Facility/Infrastructure attacks.
Planning and preparatory activities involving melee, firearms, and incendiary weapon types are
close to the target. Planning and preparatory activities involving explosives seem to fluctuate in
their spatial relationship to the target.
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Figure 42. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Weapon Type
Figure 43 below shows the signatures plotted individually for Far Left incidents by
weapon type. All signatures show a limited movement from the target over time, though the data
points for the Explosives weapon type appear to be distributed irregularly.
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Figure 43. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Weapon Type
The Far Left incidents are graphed based on the target type involved in the attack in
Figure 44 below. There is visible variation in the patterns between time signatures. It appears as
if incidents targeting private property or citizens do not involve planning at locations remote
from the target; however, other target types seem to have signatures that fluctuate considerably
indicating movement in space throughout the planning cycle.
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Figure 44. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Target Type
Far Left incidents are graphed individually based on their target type in Figure 45 below.
All attacks on the various target types identified, with the exception of Educational targets, show
a movement from the target location to a remote location and then a movement back to the target
location. This fluctuating pattern seems to indicate that Far Left plots selecting these targets
employ planning cycles that involve movement between the target and a more distant location.
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Figure 45. Time-Space Signatures for Far Left Incidents by Target Type

Far-Right
Far-Right terrorists encompass a collection of extremist groups that target specific
communities. The communities targeted are often blamed for perceived shortcomings within
society (Taylor, 2013). Far-Right groups are organized into two groups. The first group consists
of actors who claim to represent the interest of the general public over the actions of others in
society. These groups often have their ideologies characterized by value systems rooted in
antigovernment and evangelical religious extremism. An example of this type of Far-Right group
is the Army of God, a Christian extremist group that propagates a primarily anti-abortion agenda.
The second set of organizations is known as ‘hate groups;’ these groups form their ideologies
from their perceived ethno-national or religious superiority (Martin, 2011). Examples of ‘hate
groups’ include the Aryan Nation and the Jewish Defense League (JDL).
Far-Right terrorist groups have varied levels of organization. While some Far-Right
terrorists act as individuals in accordance with the opinions of a larger group, other terrorists
work in rigidly structured and organized groups where commands are facilitated through an
established hierarchy (Taylor, 2013). These groups often organized in compounds or retreats; the
compounds encourage the development of radical ideologies and violent ambitions and can
facilitate planning, training, and supply stockpiles (Taylor, 2013). In general Far-Right groups
have been characterized as less organized and less consistent than Far-Left extremism (Martin,
2011). Despite their outward image, these groups still posses deliberate polices and plots
intended to achieve desired goals within society; their actions are aimed at increasing awareness
and providing the start of changes within society and government (Hoffman 1998). Though Far
Right extremists are often stereotyped as individuals of limited accomplishment, they have
possessed the capacity to carry out plots affecting communities throughout the United States.
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Far Right The Army of God Manual provides an insight into planning cycles for FarRight terrorist groups. The manual has a section titled 99 Ways to Stop Abortion. The section
contains detailed directions for how to sabotage abortion clinics in various ways ranging from
gluing locks to destroying facilities with propane gas. Various methods also include insights into
how to avoid detection and how to increase awareness of the attack motivations. Bombings,
murders, and assaults characterize the majority of the recorded incidents carried out by Far-Right
groups. These instructions include insights into terrorist planning stages target selection, preattack planning, and attack execution.
Figure 46 below shows the signature for all Far Right records. The figure shows a
gradually decreasing signature that approaches the date and location attack. It appears that there
is a decrease in distance between the target and the preparatory act as the attack approaches in
time.
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Figure 46. Time-Space Signature for Far Right Incidents
The Distribution of Far Right Time Values for the entire Far Right dataset are shown
below in Figure 47. The bottom third of the data occur within 296 days of the attack, indicating
that the majority of activities occur within a year of the attack. The median value is 77, showing
that the bottom half of activities occur within less than 3 months of the attack. The mean value of
281.20 days is much greater than the median value and indicates that the distribution is skewed
to the right due to a much higher max value and other outliers.
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Distribution of Far Right
Time Values
Time (days)
0.00
27.50
77.00
281.20
296.00
5304.00

Min
1st Quartile
Median
Mean
3rd Quartile
Max

Figure 47. Distribution of Far Right Time Values
The Distribution of the Far Right Time values described above is shown in the histogram
in Figure 48. This figure shows that the data exhibits a right skewed distribution. It shows that a
majority of the preparatory activities of Far Right terrorist groups occur near to the time of the
attack.

Figure 48. Histogram for Distribution of Far Right Time Values
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The distance values for the Far Right dataset are summarized in Figure 49 below. The
distance values are spread more evenly within the first three quartiles of the dataset, while the
fourth quartile appears to contain the high maximum values and other outliers. This distribution
shows that the preparatory attacks are occurring at a range of distances from the target location.
Distribution of Far Left
Distance Values
Distance (miles)
Min
0.000
1st Quartile
15.570
Median
199.520
Mean
301.580
3rd Quartile
372.800
Max
2307.360
Figure 49. Distribution of Far Left Distance Values
Figure 50 below shows a histogram representing the distribution of Far Right distance
values. The histogram shows that the values are even spread within the first three quartiles, while
the third quartile occupies a much higher range. This right-skewed distribution indicates that
planning activities for Far Right groups generally occur within 400 miles of the target though
they have been recorded at much greater distances. Additionally, it shows that there is a fairly
even distribution of activities between 0 and around 400 miles from the target.
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Figure 50. Histogram for Distribution of Far Right Distance Values
A statistical summary of the first preparatory action for each of the Far Right incidents is
shown below in Figure 51. It appears that planning for Far Right incidents occurs far in advance
of the attack at a location remote from the target. This is through the median incident, which
begins 318.70 days before the attack at a location 472.500 miles away. This idea is also
supported through profile of the top third of attacks, which begin at least 214.47 days before the
attack and at a distance of 204.500 miles from the attack.
Far Right Incidents Initial Act Summary
Time (days) Distance (miles)
Min.
2.80
55.000
1st Qu.
214.47
204.500
Median
318.70
472.500
Average
500.26
985.429
3rd Qu.
758.62
1232.750
Max.
2307.36
5304.000
Figure 51. Distribution of Values for Initial Act in Far Right Incidents
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The Far Right incidents are shown below in the Figure 52. It is difficult to discern any
individual pattern due to the number of incidents and diversity in signatures. It does appear that
there is fluctuation in spatial location over time with a number of the incidents, though there are
also incidents that are more stable and imply less movement in relationship to the target. It is also
noticeable that a considerable amount of activity occurs at large distances away from the target.

Figure 52. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Incident ID
Figure 53 and Figure 54 below show the Far Right incidents graphed individually. The
incidents have been divided into two groups and graphed between two figures due to the larger
number of incidents. There are around 14 signatures that display the trend of visiting the site and
subsequently moving to a more distant location before approaching the site again. There are also
some U shaped curves, these are however incidents that are contain signatures that delve into the
negative area of the quadrant and are therefore would be more likely represented by straight lines

79

along the axis. The general trend of visiting the target, or an area with closer proximity to the
target, and relocating to further plan the attack seems to be on display in incidents such as
Incident 7351 and 50282.
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Figure 53. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Incident ID – First Set
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Figure 54. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Incident ID – Second Set

The Far Right incidents are shown in Figure 55 based on their case study. It appears from
the graph that a number of categories employ initial planning activities near the target site
followed by subsequent activities at a further distant from the target. Following a retreat from the
target area, the target is approached once more for planning and preparatory activities. This is
shown through a rise and successive fall in the signature. Though this pattern is exhibited by a
number of categories, there are also signatures that display different patterns. It is noted that Far
Right groups often organize in compounds or retreats; changes in location are often required for
the facilitation of meetings which in many cases can be linked to the location of a compound
(Taylor, Holbrook, and Currie 2013).
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Figure 55. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Case Study

Figure 56 below shows the Far Right incidents graphed by category in individual plots. There are
five signatures that show little increase or decrease between distances from the target over the
course of the planning cycle. There are also categories that exhibit approach the target, travel to
greater distances, and ultimately travel back to the target for activities during their planning
cycle.
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Figure 56. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Case Study

The Far Right incidents are graphed based on their incident subtype in Figure 57. In this
figure it appears that Armed Assaults and Bombings/Explosions involve planning near the target
throughout the planning cycle while Facility/Infrastructure attacks employ planning activities at
the target location, followed by planning at a remote location, and subsequently planning and
preparation near the target directly prior to the attack.

Figure 57. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Incident Subtype
Figure 58 below shows the Far Right incidents graphed by incident subtype in individual
plots. In this figure, the signatures are shown in greater detail. The planning cycle for Far Right
incidents involving armed assaults seem to approach the target from distance, and subsequently
retreat back to a more distant location before approaching the target for the attack.
Bombing/Explosion incidents exhibited a gradual decline in distance towards the target over time
with some minor fluctuations. Facility/Infrastructure attacks show a trend where planning
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activities are first conducted near the target, then remotely from the target, and eventually near
the target prior to the attack.

Figure 58. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Incident Subtype
The Far Right incidents are plotted by Weapon Type in Figure 59 below. The signature
for Far Right incidents involving Explosives is logically identical to the signature for Far Right
incidents of the Bombing/Explosion incident subtype while the Firearms weapon type signature
is identical to the Armed Assault incident subtype signature. The signature for the Incendiary
weapon type signature bears similarities to the Facility/Infrastructure attack incident subtype
signature, however the curve appears to show the opposite relationship, with the curve below the
x-axis into the negative space.
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Figure 59. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Weapon Type
The Far Right incidents are individually graphed based on weapon type in Figure 60. The
Far Right incidents involving explosive weapon types present the most clear and observable
signature. This signature shows activity occurring at a decreased, yet slightly fluctuating,
distance from the target as the attack gradually approaches.
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Figure 60. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Weapon Type
The Far Right Incidents are graphed based on the target type in Figure 61. The figure
shows the variance in planning cycles based on the target type. There is not a clear pattern shared
between the signatures of incidents involving various target types. There are no signatures with
stable movement in relationship to the target over time; instead there seems to be a considerable
amount of fluctuation in the location of planning activities based on target type.
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Figure 61. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Target Type
The Far Right incidents are graphed in individual plots based on the target type in Figure
62. The government target type signature bears similarities to the Explosives weapon type
signature and naturally the bombing/explosion incident subtype signature. All but one signature
at some point during their planning cycle include an identifiable pattern of approaching the
target, retreating from the target, and approaching the target again for preparation prior to the
attack.
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Figure 62. Time-Space Signatures for Far Right Incidents by Target Type

Islamic Extremist
Islamic extremists are terrorist actors that are motivated by their religion to seek social
and political change. Much of the rational for acts of Islamic terrorism is rooted in the idea that
Islam is not just a religious movement, but also a political one, and that society and politics
should function in accordance with Islam (Thackrah, 1987). Islamic extremists have derived their
hostility towards the U.S. government and its population in particular from a number of factors.
These factors range from foreign policy and international involvement, such as the U.S.
occupation of Saudi Arabia and its holy places, to distaste of modern, secular ways of life
(Hewitt, 2003).
Islamic extremist organizations, such as al Qaeda, have expansive infrastructure
throughout the world, including ‘sleeper cells’ within the United States that can be engaged in
specific attacks (Hewitt, 2003). Their operations are known to involve principles of military
organization. Insights into Islamic extremist terrorism techniques were discovered after an al
Qaeda training manual was obtained during a police raid of a house in Manchester, England. The
manual contains information on military organization and operation techniques. The guide
provides information on how to effectively gather information, avoid detection, establish safe
houses, and conduct acts of terrorism, such as kidnapping, assassinating, and bombing (Hewitt,
2003).
Islamic extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, often have expansive networks that traverse
international boarders, therefore the planning cycle has been hard to discern. Cells can be located
across political boundaries and planning can last months or even years. It has been noted that
Islamic extremist actors have been able to live and work in areas for long periods of time without
detection while planning and training for attacks (Taylor, 2013). The ability for Islamic terrorists
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to avoid detection and live normal seeming lifestyles is vital to their success; techniques for
preventing suspicion have been discovered in the al Qaeda training manual.
The signature for all Islamic Extremist records is shown in Figure 63 below. The
signature shows a great variation in planning even locations occurring 500 days before the attack
with three outlier events at greater than 1000 days before the attack. Signature shows that
planning events occurring at the longest time before the attack are very close to the target.
Preparatory events then occur at a greater distance from the target before moving to closer
distances from the target. There is also slight fluctuation in the distance between the preparatory
events and the target towards the end of the planning cycle.

Figure 63. Time-Space Signature for Islamic Extremist Incidents
Figure 64 contains figures that represent the distribution of the time values for Islamic
Incidents. The distribution shows that the lower third of values occur within around 200 days of
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the attack while the upper third of values are stretched between around 200 days from the attack
all the way to around 1700 days from the attack. The median value of 44 shows that the lower
half of planning events occur within less than two months from the attack.
Distribution of Islamic
Time Values
Time (days)
Min
0.00
1st Quartile
14.00
Median
44.00
Mean
133.80
3rd Quartile
198.50
Max
1669.00
Figure 64. Distribution of Islamic Extremist Time Values
Figure 65 below shows the distribution of Islamic extremist incident time values in a
histogram. The values are represented as a right skewed distribution. The histogram shows that
the preparatory events are concentrated towards time periods closer to the date of the attack
while preparatory events a long time before the attack are far less frequent.
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Figure 65. Histogram of the Distribution of Islamic Extremist Time Values
Figure 66 shows the distribution of distance values within the Islamic extremist dataset.
There is a concentration of events with close distances from the target as the lower quartile is set
at 41.630; however, second quartile of values seem to occupy a large range, as the median value
is 871.340. There are a considerable amount of incidents at a great distance from the target as
the upper half of the values range from between 871.340 to 2461.790 miles from the target.
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Distribution of Islamic Distance
Values
Distance (miles)
Min
0.000
1st Quartile
41.630
Median
871.340
Mean
744.920
3rd Quartile
1092.850
Max
2461.790
Figure 66. Distribution of Islamic Extremist Distance Values
The Distribution if Islamic Extremist distance values is summarized in Figure 67. This
figure illustrates the irregular distribution of distance values. The histogram resembles an Edge
Peak distribution as it has a large peak at the left tail, however, due to its multiple peaks it could
also resemble a bimodal distribution. The histogram shows that there is a cluster of preparatory
events occurring at a close proximity to the target, but also a cluster of preparatory events
occurring at a greater distance from the target.
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Figure 67. Histogram of the Distribution of Islamic Extremist Distance Values
Figure 68 below shows a statistical summary of the first act in each incidents planning
cycle. Planning cycles for Islamic incidents range greatly, varying from 15 days prior the attack
to over four years prior the attack. Initial Planning for the lower half of incidents occurs in under
a 354 days, or around one year, from the attack while the upper half extends between around 354
days to over four years. Initial planning for Islamic extremist attacks begins at a range of
locations. Planning for the lower quarter of attacks begins within 42 miles of the target, while the
upper half begins at over 712 miles from the target.
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Islamic Incidents Initial Act Summary
Time (days) Distance (miles)
Min.
15.00
0.660
1st Qu.
91.00
9.565
Median
354.00
41.631
Mean
431.37
712.647
3rd Qu.
605.00
1411.931
Max.
1669.00
2461.788
Figure 68. Distribution of Values for Initial Act in Islamic Extremist Incidents
The Islamic Incidents are graphed by Incident ID in Figure 69 below. The graph reveals
that the incidents generally begin at around 500 days prior to the attack or less. The graph shows
that there are several incidents that contain stable movement in relationship to the target, while
other incidents contain peaks in their signatures and thus fluctuate in terms of their distance from
the target over time.

Figure 69. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Incident ID
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The Islamic Incidents are displayed in individual plots based on their Incident ID in
Figure 70 below. Once again it becomes apparent that there are a number of incidents with very
flat signatures, indicating little movement in space during the planning cycle. Incidents 96009623, 9845, and 50406, have signatures that show initial activity close to the target followed by
activity at a more remote location, and subsequently activity near or at the target location. These
incidents, as well as other incidents within this category, show peaks within the signatures
indicating that approaches towards the target are followed by withdrawals to distant locations.
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Figure 70. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Incident ID

When the Islamic Extremist incidents are plotted based on their associated case study, as shown
in Figure 71, the patterns identified are similar to the patterns observed in Figure 70. Although
there are case studies that do not involve planning at locations remote from the target, there are
also case studies that fluctuate greatly in their spatial relationship to the target.

Figure 71. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Case Study
The Islamic extremist incidents are shown in Figure 72 in individual plots based on their
associated case study. Case Studies such as the AQ Ohio Plot 2003, AQ Smadi, and AQ Little
rock, show little movement through space over their planning cycle. Incidents such as these
could be the result of actors planning or even residing within a close proximity to their target.
Other incidents, such as AQ 9-11, AQ NYC Subway 2009, and AQ New York involve
preparatory activates at varying locations. These planning cycles employ surveillance and plot
testing
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Figure 72. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Case Study

The time space signatures for Islamic Incidents by incident subtype, shown in Figure 73,
reveals

that

planning

events

for

Hijacking,

Facility/Infrastructure

Attack,

and

Bombing/Explosion, incident subtypes occur in fluctuating distances from the target, while
Armed Assaults occur relatively close in space and time to the actual attack. The planning events
involved in hijacking incidents seem to cluster at large distances from the target while those
planning events for Bombing/Explosion occur at relatively closer distances to the target.

Figure 73. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Incident Subtype
When plotted on individual plots, shown in Figure 74, the Incident Subtypes of Islamic
Incidents exhibit fairly unique signatures. The Armed Assault planning events do not fluctuate in
relationship to the target. The Bombing/Explosion preparatory events seem to occur at areas near
to the target, while the Hijacking preparatory events occur at areas distant from the target. The
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preparatory events for Facility/Infrastructure attacks are clustered near the target but also
incorporate planning in areas distant from the target.

Figure 74. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Incident Subtype
As in previous analysis, there are clear connections that can be made between the
Incident Subtype and the Weapon Type. Figure 75 shows that preparatory events involving
melee compose of the same events that compose the Hijacking signature in Figure 73. These
events also occur at distances very remote from the target. In this case, the plot that ultimately
relied on melee was the AQ 9-11 plot involving the hijacking of commercial airlines. Logically,
the signature for the Explosives weapon type is identical to the signature for Bombing/Explosion
incident subtype and the signature for Firearm weapon type is identical to the Armed Assault
incident subtype.
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Figure 75. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Weapon Type
The Islamic Incidents are graphed individually based on the weapon type involved in the
attack in Figure 76 below. While plots involving Explosives seem to employ a long planning
cycle, plots involving other weapon types involve planning within shorter time frames from the
attack. The Time-Space Signatures also show that there is fluctuation in the location of planning
activities with regard to the target location in all weapon types except for Firearms.
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Figure 76. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Weapon Type
The Islamic incidents are graphed based on the target type below in Figure 77. While
Islamic extremists with plots targeting certain target types, such as NGO or Businesses, employ
preparatory acts near the target, other targets, such as Transportation and Financial entities, have
involved planning at more varied distances from the target. In this case the transportation
signature is a product of the AQ 9-11 plot and is thus tied to the Hijacking incident subtype and
melee weapon type.
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Figure 77. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Target Type
The Islamic Incidents are plotted on individual graphs in Figure 78 below based on the
target type involved. From this display it becomes apparent that all target types involve
movement through space prior to the attack. It is also noticeable that attacks on these targets
require preparatory acts near the target followed by planning and preparation faraway from the
target.
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Figure 78. Time-Space Signatures for Islamic Extremist Incidents by Target Type

V. Conclusion
Currently, the use of informants within terrorist organizations is one of the most common
methods used to thwart terrorist operations (Hewitt 2003); however, police work and intelligence
analysis techniques have been successfully used to assess suspicious activity and incidents of
crime in order to make arrests and prevent terrorist attacks (United States et al. 2011).
Information describing patterns in terrorist planning activities can be useful for detecting and
ultimately preventing terrorist activity. Despite the variety of terrorist actors, the planning cycles
employed by terrorists are theorized to involve a pattern of preparatory activities. The common
theory is that terrorists select a target, visit and survey the target in order to obtain relative
information and intelligence, plan the attack and acquire materials, test the plan, and ultimately
commence the attack at the target location (Stratfor 2012; NYS Office of Counter Terrorism
2014; United States et al 2005). Generalizations describing where terrorists are in relation to
their target throughout their plot can aid investigations into terrorist activity.
The methodology created for this study, involving the construction of time space
signatures for the analysis of terrorist planning cycle, proved to be very useful. The signatures
are an effective way of visualizing any changes in the location of preparatory activities over the
lifecycle of a terrorist plot. This methodology successfully accomplishes the goal of visualizing
where terrorist actors are in relationship to their target during planning and preparation activities.
There is an enormous amount of diversity in the ideologies and motivations of terrorist
groups (Hewitt 2003); this diversity inherently influences the tactics used and the targets
selected. It is clear that the four different categories of terrorists, including Environmental
extremist, Far Left, Far Right, and Islamic extremist, exhibit unique patterns in the movement of
their preparatory activities in relationship to the target throughout their planning cycle. This
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observation is of no coincidence, as the four categories each select different target types and
employ different methods in their attacks. The signatures for these four groups show that
Environmental extremist plots involve planning near their targets with the exception of limited
outlier planning events at a great distance from their targets. Similarly, Far Left activists
consistently carry out planning and preparation activities near to their target. Both Far Right and
Islamic Extremist planning and preparation activity seems to vary and fluctuate greatly with
regard to their distance from the target. These groups seem to travel to more distant areas as well
as areas of a close proximity to the target. These observations are best seen in Figure 11 and
Figure 12 in the results section.
Environmental incidents of terrorism appear to vary in their planning cycles, making it
difficult to identify a key pattern. There are incidents where planning is consistently conducted
near the target as well as incidents where planning activity is conducted further away from the
target. It is observed that the majority of Environmental planning activities occur close to the
target. Though The Alf Primer suggests leaving your immediate area to conduct actions, it
appears that most planning, including material procurement and meetings, is conducted near the
target. Within the environmental category it was clear that the bombing/explosion incidents
involved planning at remote distances while the facility/infrastructure attacks involved planning
near the target.
Planning for Far Left terrorist incidents seemed to occur near the target location
throughout the planning cycle. The trend for the entire dataset indicates that planning activity
occurs at a close and constant distance from the target, however at the incident level, plots
seemed to involve movement between the target location and a more remote locations, shown by
the fluctuating signature curves. The case study analysis shows four of the various organizations,
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including the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, New African Freedom Fighters, UFF,
and Yahweh, plan within a close and constant distance from their target while the JRA, May 19
Communist Order, and FRB fluctuate more in their distance from the target over time. There was
great variation in the relationship between preparatory incidents and their target location when
the incidents were plotted by target type.
The planning activities of Far Right terrorists show a less consistent pattern in their
relationship to the target. A larger amount of planning activities occur at further distances from
the target than in plots of both the Environment and Far Left groups, indicating that these groups
are meeting, planning, and preparing for their attacks from more distant locations. Additionally,
when represented based on Incident, the vast majority of events show fluctuation in location
relative to the target, indicating more movement during the planning cycle. This indicates that
these croups are approaching the target for planning but also conducting planning from more
distant areas. An assessment of Far Right terrorist planning based on case studies confirmed this
observation, as there is movement shown within almost all the signatures.
Similar to the planning activities of Far Right terrorists, Islamic extremist terrorist
planning activities occupy a range of locations with varying distances from the target. Plotting
the signatures based on Incident ID and Case Study supports this statement as it shows
movement between the target and more remote locations. The movement occurs in wavelike
patterns where the target is visited or approached followed by a subsequent retreat before
approaching once again.
Plotting the incidents based on Incident ID proved to be the most useful, as it shows the
movement of actors through the organization of a single attack. Additionally, the trends
identified by graphing incidents by weapon type, incident subtype, and target type generally
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showed similar patterns to those observed during analysis of the incidents based on incident ID.
This is due to the fact that the weapon, subtype, and target attributes are generally constant
within each Incident; therefore the lines appear to be similar.
Although it is difficult to generalize the patterns of terrorist planning cycles, due to the
variety of attack types even within terrorist categories there are trends that can be observed. The
noticeable trend of movement between target and distant locations is visible for numerous
incidents. This observation supports the idea that intelligence gathering, reconnaissance activity,
and test runs are important steps in terrorist planning and occur near the target while meetings,
procurement, and training can occur at more remote locations. This study also shows that while
terrorist plots share theoretical steps during planning efforts, there is are distinct differences
between planning cycles among the various terrorist group types.
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Future Research Direction
Continued research into patterns within terrorist planning cycles is important. The
methodology constructed for this analysis provides an insight into movement of terrorists during
their planning cycles that can be implemented to supplement future analysis.
There are a number of improvements that could be made to the dataset. One of the more
significant improvements would be improving the accuracy of the location coordinates for the
preparatory activities and thus the distance measurement between the preparatory activity and the
attack location. In a number of records the exact location is unknown. Consequently, the
coordinates for the location are gathered from the centroid of the smallest location level known,
normally the city name. The measurement error is not a factor when the distance between the
locations are great, however when the distance between the two locations is short, such as two
adjoining cities, the amount of error in the measurement is directly related to the diameter or size
of area within the city limits. A methodology for this analysis needs to be created to reduce error
between the centroid measurements. Additionally, there are inherent shortcomings that result
from extracting terrorist planning cycles data from court case reports, such as activity that was
not discovered in the investigation and thus not included in the incident report. The source of
error regarding unreported activity can only be resolved at the investigation and court case level.
The time-space signature methodology can also be implemented in further exploratory
studies. For example, the analysis can be used to determine spatial and temporal patterns in the
relationship between antecedent event type and the target.
This analysis investigated a large amount of incidents simultaneously. The signatures for
each incident could be investigated individually in conjunction with a description or explanation
for the movement. This would provide further information about why movement between
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locations is or is not occurring, and would elaborate on trends discovered in this exploratory
analysis.
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VII. Appendix
Appendix A.

Variable #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Incident Variables
Variable Level
Variable Description
CATEGORY
Category of organization
Links a CASESTUDY record to a court
CASESTUDY_ID
case
Name of data collection pertaining to one
CASESTUDY
or more terrorism incidents that have the
same group of persons involved
INC_ID
Incident ID
INC_DESC
Description of Incident
INC_LAT
Latitude Location of Incident
INC_LON
Longitude Location of Incident
INC_YEAR
Year of Incident
INC_DATE
Date of Incident
INC_TYPE
Type of Incident
INC_SUBTYPE
Subtype of Incident
ANT_ID
Antecedent ID
ANT_DESC
Description of Antecedent Act
ANT_LAT
Latitude Location of Antecedent Act
ANT_LON
Longitude Location of Antecedent Act
ANT_YEAR
Year of Antecedent Incident
ANT_DATE
Date of Antecedent Incident
ANT_TYPE
Type of Antecedent Incident
ANT_SUBTYPE
Subtype of Antecedent Incident
Distance from Incident to Antecedent
INC_TO_ANT_DIST
Incident
Distance from Incident to Antecedent
INC_TO_ANT_DIST_ADJ
Incident Adjusted
Time between Incident and Antecedent
INC_TO_ANT_DAYS
Incident
Time between Incident and Antecedent
APPR_INC_TO_ANT_DAYS
Incident in Days
WEAPON
Weapon Classification
WEAPON_TYPE
Weapon Type
TARGET
Target
TARGET_TYPE
Target Type
TARGET_SUBTYPE
Target Subtype
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